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402 Pa. Superior Ct. 449 (1991)
587 A.2d 335
Charles E. BEECH, Appellant,v.RAGNAR BENSON, INC., Appellee.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania.
Argued December 4, 1990.
Filed March 5, 1991.
Petition for Allowance of Appeal Granted June 7, 1991.
*450 Louis R. Salamon, Pittsburgh, for appellant.
Roger C. Wiegand, Sewickley, for appellee.
Before ROWLEY, POPOVICH and MONTGOMERY, JJ.
POPOVICH, Judge:
This is an appeal from an order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing with prejudice the appellant's complaint in equity on the grounds of laches. The trial court's order was entered following consideration of the appellee's motion for summary judgment. We affirm.
Both parties are aware of the events which led to the instant litigation. Rather than summarizing the history of the case here, we will echo the concise statement of facts offered by the trial court.
The plaintiff [appellant] wanted fill removed from his property and the defendant [appellee] needed fill for a *451 construction project nearby[.] [T]he parties agreed that the defendant would take fill from plaintiff's real estate. This was done in 1981 and in 1983 the plaintiff sued on the ground that the defendant had not properly reshaped the land after digging and excavating. This was denied by Answer in 1983 and the deposition of Mr. Beech was taken. Then the defendant heard nothing more of the case for over five (5) years.Trial court opinion, at 1. In January, 1989, five years after the appellee Ragnar Benson filed its Answer and New Matter, the appellant Beech filed his Reply and placed the case at issue. In January, 1990, Ragnar Benson filed its motion for summary judgment. Thereafter, the trial court dismissed Beech's complaint with prejudice. This appeal followed.
Beech has preserved four issues for our consideration. He asks
(1) Whether a claim at law for money damages made in an action in equity can be dismissed upon application of the doctrine of laches?(2) Whether summary judgment can be granted on a laches theory for a hiatus between the accrual of a cause of action and the date when the complaint was served if the hiatus was not inordinate, if a defendant does not prove prejudice during such hiatus or if genuine issues of material fact exist as to such prejudice?(3) Whether summary judgment can be granted on a laches theory for inactivity in an action after that action is at issue if that inactivity is excusable, if a defendant does not prove prejudice during such period of inactivity or if genuine issues of material fact exist as to such prejudice?(4) Whether the doctrine of laches should, as a matter of law, be applicable to inactivity in an action after the pleadings in that action are closed?Appellant's brief, at 3. Since Beech's issues are all intertwined, we are able to dispose of them under one theory the doctrine of laches. We find this Court's holding in *452 Nilon Brothers Enterprises v. Lucente, 315 Pa.Super. 343, 461 A.2d 1312 (1983) to be controlling.[1]
Before we discuss the applicability of the laches doctrine to the instant situation, we note our standard and scope and review. In Vargo v. Hunt, 398 Pa.Super. 600, 581 A.2d 625 (1990), this Court stated:
A determination of whether the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment is to be upheld requires an appellate court to decide whether the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Overly v. Kass, 382 Pa.Super. 108, 554 A.2d 970, 971 (1989); see also Chiricos v. Forest Lake Council Boy Scouts of America, [391] Pa.Super. [491], 571 A.2d 474, 475 (1990). In making such a finding, we must accept as true all properly pleaded facts, as well as all reasonable inferences which might be drawn therefrom. Furthermore, we shall not disturb the trial court's ruling unless there has been an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion. Overly v. Kass, supra.Id. See also Bobb v. Kraybill, 354 Pa.Super. 361, 364, 511 A.2d 1379, 1380 (1986) ('[t]o determine the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and any doubts must be resolved against the entry of judgment. *453 [....] Summary Judgment is appropriate only in those cases which are clear and free from doubt.' (emphasis added)); Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035. See Laspino v. Rizzo, 40 Pa. Commw. 625, 630, 398 A.2d 1069, 1072 (1979) (Pa.R.Civ.P. 1501 makes applicable to actions in equity Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035). With these standards in mind, we will now address Beech's contentions.
Beech first asserts that his complaint contained a prayer for money damages. Therefore, the doctrine of laches cannot apply. After review, we reject Beech's claim, even though his statement of the law is technically correct.
Our research reveals that laches, a doctrine of stale demand, is purely an equitable principle and it may not be invoked as a defense in a court of law. Transbel Inv. Co. v. Scott, 26 A.2d 205, 344 Pa. 544 (1942). Actions in law are governed by the statute of limitations. Id. Although Beech seems to argue that he has set forth an action in law, we find that equitable principles were properly applied in the instant case.
Beech's complaint is entitled 'Complaint in Equity.' He requests relief in the nature of specific performance. He contends that he 'has no adequate remedy at law and suffers immediate and irreparable harm and damage by virtue of the failure of Defendant to properly perform its duties under said License Agreement.' See Appellant's Complaint, at para. 14. The complaint clearly rings in requests for equitable relief.[2]
The paragraph of his complaint, upon which Beech relies for support, requests
C. In the alternative, requiring Defendant to immediately finance all costs and expenses which are necessary in order: (1) for all engineering/geologic and other studies to be completed to determine the appropriate procedures *454 to abate all problems caused by the failure of Defendant to properly perform its duties under said License Agreement; (2) for all work to be undertaken and completed which will prevent further landslides, rock slides and erosion and sedimentation from occurring; (3) to cause the performance of all duties which Defendant was required to perform under said License Agreement. [Further, Beech requests] D. Awarding costs, expenses and counsel fees to Plaintiff. E. Granting to plaintiff damages, indemnification and other equitable relief deemed appropriate by the Court.Appellant's Complaint, at 7-8.
While we appreciate that the instant case involved a request for money damages, a prayer for alternative forms of relief will not defeat an equity action. See 14 Standard PA Practice 2d §§ 79.2 ('[r]emedies at law and in equity may coexist and be concurrent.... [O]nce a party makes an election and files an action, that party cannot pursue that alternate remedy....'); 79:13 ('... it is a fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence that a court sitting in equity will not invoke its jurisdiction where there exists an adequate remedy at law.... It is not sufficient that a party to an equity action may have some remedy at law, the remedy at law must be an adequate one, and the mere existence of a legal remedy will not oust equitable jurisdiction.'); 79:21 (discusses claims for money damages); 79:39-79:50 (discusses laches) 80:6 (discusses complaints in equity, generally); 80:27 (discusses relief requested); James Bros. Lumber Co. v. Union Banking & Trust Co. of Dubois, Pa., 432 Pa. 129, 247 A.2d 587 (1968) (plaintiff's action for specific performance was dismissed for failure to prosecute the claim during a ten and one half year period, even though the case also involved a request for an accounting). In fact, '[i]t is not proper for a plaintiff to file his complaint both in equity and at law; where it is clear that the plaintiff wishes to pursue equitable remedies, the action at law will be stricken as surplusage.' 14 Standard PA Practice 2d § 80:6.
*455 Here, not only does Beech request specific performance throughout his complaint, but additionally, he requests equitable remedies in his claim for money damages (see para. C.(3), supra.). Despite his assertions that he would suffer irreparable harm and that he has no adequate remedy at law (see Complaint, filed June 2, 1982 and served on Ragnar Benson December 2, 1983), there is no indication in the pleadings that Beech ever pursued any remedial steps to reshape his land. See allegations at para. C.(1), (2), supra.
This case clearly involved the principles of equity. While we are cognizant of the many cases that hold that actions in law may continue even if an equity action is dismissed, this case does not fall within the purview of those decisions.[3] At no time was this lawsuit pursued as a *456 breach of contract case.[4] At no time was this action brought in a court of law. Rather, Beech attempts to hang his hat on the fact that he asked for money damages as a form of alternative relief at the time his complaint was filed. He contends, therefore, that he may advance a civil action now to recover that which he failed to win in equity. This Court will not permit semantics to allow the appellant to gain through the back door what he could not accomplish through the front. What the appellant seeks is specific performance. We will not disturb the trial court's holding that 'this is a case where laches of the plaintiff is so clear that the suit must be dismissed with prejudice upon this basis.' Trial court opinion, at 2.
We reject Beech's second claim of error for the simple reason that his complaint was dismissed for the delay that transpired between the taking of his deposition in 1984, and the placing of the case at issue in 1989. It was not dismissed because Beech 'sat on his rights' between the date of accrual of the cause of action and the date of service of the complaint. Contrary to Beech's assertion, we find that the trial court was clear in its holding that the five year period of non-activity was the reason for the entry of judgment against Beech, not the two years that transpired between the date of accrual and the date of service of the complaint.
*457 While Beech's third argument has some appeal at first glance, it is nevertheless misleading. The pleadings closed in this case on January 23, 1989 when Beech filed its Reply to Ragnar Benson's New Matter. (We note that Ragnar Benson's Answer and New Matter was filed December 14, 1983). On January 23, 1989, the action was placed at issue. Thus, there was no inactivity between the closing of the pleadings and the time when the matter was finally ripe for consideration. The inactivity here, for our purposes, occurred between the time Beech was deposed (1984) and the time the final pleading was filed (1989).
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Moreover, while Beech argues that Ragnar Benson was in no way prejudiced during the periods of inactivity, we must agree with the trial court that the record reflects substantial prejudice to Ragnar Benson's rights. See also 14 Standard PA Practice 2d §§ 79:40, 79:42 and 79:44. While this Court is bound to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, we are inclined to defer to the trial court's findings here. As the trial court observed,
[t]he defendant asserts that everyone of their employees who were associated with the incident have left their employ and are unavailable and that the file cannot be located. There is no physical evidence remaining because the area has been overgrown. In these circumstances, the procrastination of the plaintiff would unduly prejudice the right of the defendant to a fair trial.Trial court opinion, at 1-2. There is ample support in the record for the trial court's conclusion and we will not disturb its determinations. See Easton Theatres, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Land & Mortgage Co., Inc., 265 Pa.Super. 334, 343-44, 401 A.2d 1333, 1338 (1979).
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Finally, Beech argues that the doctrine of laches does not apply to inactivity in an action after the pleadings in that action are closed. This Court addressed the exact issue in Nilon, supra, and clearly held, '[i]n terms of the time element, a lack of due diligence in prosecuting one's claim as well as a lack of due diligence in instituting *458 it can activate laches.' Id. 315 Pa.Super. at 346, 461 A.2d at 1314 (citations omitted). We find no merit in Beech's final contention.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Order affirmed.
NOTES[1] The Nilon case is helpful inasmuch as it sets forth cogently the law on laches.
Laches arises when a defendant's position or rights are so prejudiced by length of time and inexcusable delay, plus attendant facts and circumstances, that it would be an injustice to permit presently the assertion of a claim against him. [Citations omitted]. 'Laches, unlike the statute of limitations, does not operate solely by the passage of time.' [Citation omitted]. 'The application of the equitable doctrine of laches does not depend upon the fact that a certain definite time has elapsed since the cause of action accrued, but whether, under the circumstances of the particular case, the complaining party is guilty of want of due diligence in failing to institute his action to another's prejudice.' [Citation omitted]. The rationale is that 'acquiescence is presumed from delay.' [Citation omitted].
Id. 315 Pa.Super. at 346, 461 A.2d at 1314.
[2] Even in his motion for amendment of pre-trial order, which was not filed until February 1990, Beech stated, 'The above-captioned action is an action in equity in which Plaintiff is seeking relief, inter alia, in the nature of an Order under the terms of which Defendant is directed to enter upon Plaintiff's land to take certain physical action to stabilize same.' See id. at para. 1 (emphasis added).
[3] These cases concern the proposition that '[i]n dealing with legal rules, a court sitting in equity follows and is bound by rules of law, and does not use equitable considerations to deprive a party of his rights at law.' 14 Standard PA Practice 2d § 79:2. See Bauer v. P.A. Cutri Co. of Bradford, 434 Pa. 305, 310, 253 A.2d 252, 255 (1969) (once the appellee asked to have a covenant-not-to-compete declared null and void, the action was at equity, 'and having granted the equitable relief prayed for, the chancellor was also free to resolve other questions raised in the litigation[;]' [however], 'in dealing with legal rights, a court of equity follows and is bound by rules of law.'). See Easton Theatres, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Land & Mortgage Co., Inc., 265 Pa.Super. 334, 350-51, 401 A.2d 1333, 1342 (1979) (issue involved alleged breach of contract and whether chancellor should have awarded monetary damages in addition to specific performance; this Court discussed the general principle that 'a court of equity follows and is bound by rules of law, and does not use equitable considerations to deprive a party of his rights at law.' (citations omitted)); see also Wade v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 283 Pa.Super. 464, 470-73, 424 A.2d 902, 905-06 (1981) (action for negligence; discusses court's equitable powers once equity takes jurisdiction over a controversy). See Fountain Hill Underwear Mills v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers' Union of America, 393 Pa. 385, 393, 143 A.2d 354, 359 (1958) ('. . . the filing of a complaint in trespass for damages does not oust equity of its jurisdiction, or prove that plaintiffs have a complete and adequate remedy at law.'); see also id. at n. 8. See Wilson v. King of Prussia Enterprises, Inc., 422 Pa. 128, 221 A.2d 123 (1966) (equity action was properly dismissed for laches; action for money damages was to be pursued at law where breach of contract occurred).
Again, we note that the gravaman of the instant complaint was alleged improper performance of land clearing and excavation activities on Beech's real estate. See Appellant's Complaint, at para. 11. Beech asserted,
... although Mr. Kreh, on behalf of Defendant, admitted that Defendant failed to perform many of the duties required of Defendant under said License Agreement and although Mr. Kreh, on behalf of Defendant, offered to pay Plaintiff the sum of $3,500.00 in order to avoid the necessity of Defendant having to return to Plaintiffs said real estate (an offer which could not then and cannot now be accepted) neither Mr. Kreh nor any other officer, agent, servant, employee or sub-contractor of Defendant has attempted to properly perform the obligations and duties of Defendant under said License Agreement despite numerous demands that such proper performance be undertaken.
Id. At all times, Beech's requested relief was in the nature of specific performance.
[4] To clarify, Beech did not request monetary relief, at law, to compensate for the alleged breach of the license agreement. He asked for 'damages' to effect specific performance.
'It really started with a cement finisher by the name of Jockey,' said Ray Benson, looking as if he would be more comfortable behind a desk than on a living room sofa. Jockey is dead now, he said, and this was 33 years ago, but a lot of things seem to live with 64-year-old Ray Benson.
Jockey was a bachelor who spent most of his money on booze, and he never did take care of himself, Benson said. He lived from week to week and from paycheck to paycheck, mostly off the largesse of his employer, Ray`s father, Ragnar Benson.
Ragnar Benson was by all accounts the type who would give Jockey whatever he needed just about whenever he asked. But if, for instance, Ragnar said to charge a meal at a local restaurant and use his name, Jockey would say no. He could eat somewhere else a lot cheaper and would prefer the cash.
'So he just wanted the money and he wanted to drink,' said Ray, who was quite irritated at the time.
'Father, what do you think would happen if, say, you die and Jockey gets hurt so he can`t take care of himself,' Ray asked. 'Do you expect me to support him or take care of him?'
'Of course,' said Ragnar Benson.
'How do you expect me to do it?' came the response.
Ragnar Benson Inc. was at the time one of the 10 largest general contracting firms in the United States, a monolithic company that employed thousands of people. Supporting each employee indiscriminately seemed to Ray Benson, who would inherit the company and was to be named president and chief executive officer the next year, a bit much to handle.
'Well, with the money,' said his father, groping for a response.
'With the company money, or some way, your money, the company`s money, some way.'
So Ray Benson made a proposal: 'I said here is a way we can make these people save money. Let`s put money away for them.' So Ragnar Benson finally agreed to start a profit-sharing plan.
If Ray Benson were a politician, you probably would vote for him, but not as you would have voted for his father and not as you would vote for Ronald Reagan, not because of any movie star looks, although his eyes are shockingly blue and his chin Kirk-Douglas-square-not because of any anecdotal view of the world that makes everyone laugh a little more but think a little less.
You probably would vote for Ray Benson because that profit-sharing and retirement plan eventually became worth more than the company itself. And because Jockey finally got his money.
Whether he spent it on horses or liquor or food cannot be known. Ragnar Benson and his son would both have hoped for the food. But as if just to be sure, when Ray sold the company more than 20 years later, he donated the buildings in which Ragnar Benson Inc. operated in the Austin neighborhood of Chicago to Lutheran Social Services of Illinois. Part would be used as a treatment center for alcoholics.
By that time, Ray`s penchant for giving was well established. Countless dollars had gone to other causes, many of them through a fund set up in the name of a deceased daughter at St. Matthew Lutheran Church in Itasca. Now worth about $1 million, the interest it generates is used for everything from buying food for the hungry to buying trees for the streets of Itasca. Much goes for counseling.
If there is a common theme, it seems only that the majority of his contributions have gone to the working man.
When the board of Itasca School District 10 voted last year against a 9 percent salary increase for its nonteaching staff members and settled on a 7.5 percent increase, Ray Benson offered to make up the $8,000 difference from his own pocket.
'I felt those people deserved to be paid more,' he said simply.
The board, of which he is president, turned down the contribution, saying it would undermine its integrity.
'He is very, I do not want to use the word `domineering,` but very strong, and some people feel intimidated,' said Rose Traeger, the secretary of the board and the only vote other than Benson in favor of allowing the donation.
'I would listen to him before anyone else. A man does not make millions in business and not know what he is doing.'
Asked whether the descriptions of his father as a millionaire contractor that circulated in the press in the 1950s and 1960s were accurate, Benson demured, indicating it depends if you count the money he set aside for his grandchildren.
'We are not nearly as wealthy as people think we are,' he said, adding that it is not likely the Benson name would appear on the Fortune 500 list of the world`s wealthiest people. Maybe if the category were enlarged a bit from 500, he said, like to a million.
Nevertheless, it seems that Ragnar Benson had his extravagances. It is estimated that he spent more than $50,000 in 1957 to take 69 friends and relatives to Sweden, where he and many of the others had been born. When one of his nieces, whom he had promised to take along, was prevented from going because she was expected to go into labor, he made a special trip three months later. This time, he took just his wife, his niece and her baby.
Ragnar Benson eventually became known as America`s unofficial emissary to Sweden, making dozens of trips. He was so pleased to be named guest of honor at Minnesota`s Swedish-American day in 1959 that he invited all of his employees with more than 15 years of service to go along. They totaled 77, so he chartered three Pullman coaches.
That he had money is undeniable. In 1959, he personally guaranteed promoter Bill Rosensohn $500,000 if he would stage the Floyd Patterson-Ingemar Johansson heavyweight championship fight at Soldier Field. Rosensohn decided on New York anyway.
Despite it all, and quite unlike his son in later years, the most interesting story about Ragnar Benson is not what he did with his money but how he got it.
Ragnar Benson landed at Ellis Island at the age of 12 with only five $1 bills in his pocket and fewer English words in his vocabulary. And yet by the time he received a Horatio Alger award in New York in 1969, he was a friend of the King of Sweden and owner of one of the largest general contracting companies in the United States. Standing next to him that day at the Waldorf- Astoria in New York and receiving the same award was none other than the governor of California, Ronald Reagan.
'Actually my father`s first name was Eric,' Benson said in explaining how Chicago and much of the rest of the world came to know him by another name almost 50 years ago.
'His name was Eric Ragnar Benson. But when he first came over they used to call him `earache` and he didn`t like that. So then he became Ragnar.'
Others knew him by other names. When, as a youngster he told a prospective employer at a Chicago Avenue men`s clothing store that his name was Ragnar, the man replied that was too bad. He probably could have had a job, but no clothing store could put up with an employee who was bound to be called Rags for short.
'Well, Father says, `You call me anything you want to call me, just give me the job.` So they called him Jim.' Long after he became known to the rest of the world as Ragnar Benson, many of the old family friends still called him Uncle Jim.
From working in a clothing store, he went on to become a stone mason and bricklayer, began to organize and specialize in concrete and masonry projects in 1922 and expanded into the corporation of Ragnar Benson Inc. in 1933.
It is difficult to separate wholly what Ray Benson is from what Ragnar Benson was. Ray himself makes little attempt. And although his father has been dead for 10 years and the company named after him has been sold, he often speaks of his father in the present tense.
Nevertheless, said Don Hallberg, the president of Lutheran Social Services, who grew up in the Austin neighborhood with Ray Benson and once worked for his father, the two became very different people.
'His father was the old salt,' Hallberg said. 'He came over from the old country. When you saw Ragnar Benson walking down the street, well, you probably dressed better than he did. He was as common as the shoe.
'Ray is the next generation of businessman,' said Hallberg. 'He and I grew up in this country. We did not come over from the old country.' Where Ragnar came from the college of hard knocks, Ray went to Northwestern University and became an engineer.
Under the dual direction of father and son, Ragnar Benson Inc. continued to expand, mostly working in industry. General Motors, Ford Motor Co., William Wrigley Jr. Co., International Harvester, Commonwealth Edison, Greyhound, Motorola and United States Steel were all customers.
Their employees eventually numbered in the thousands.
The famous cooling towers at Three Mile Island were among 22 that Ragnar Benson Inc. built around the country. Ironically, although those towers perhaps are destined to become their best remembered work, they also were among the reasons Ray decided to sell most of the company in 1979.
'I have always considered them a high-risk job,' he said. 'In case there was a (construction) accident, they would all be killed because the walls are only a little more than a foot thick and you have to go up 40 stories on scaffolding. I felt that just one bad accident could wipe us out.' Similarly, it became increasingly risky to work on jobs that were so large they would have to be bid two years before they could be completed and with more variables to consider.
Ragnar Benson Inc. today is a wholly owned subsidiary of the Austin Co., headquartered in Cleveland. Offices still exist in Park Ridge and Pittsburgh, and, according to a spokesman, there are at least a dozen major projects going on right now in the United States.
Where Ragnar Benson`s legacy became the business he founded and left to his son, Ray Benson`s legacy has become a church, schools, community programs and to some extent, a village he helped form.
Aside from serving on the local school board for 35 years and being largely credited with one of the lowest tax rates and most efficient school systems in Du Page County, he also has served on the village of Itasca Planning Commission.
It was Benson who recommended that the village allow the development of what is now the Hamilton Lakes area by one firm, Trammell Crow. The development is slowly paying off for the village and the school district in the form of a solid commercial tax base.
Among other things, Benson has served on the board of directors of Augustana College, Shimer College and the Austin YMCA. In 1960 he received the Young Chicagoan of the Year award. For the last five years he has served on the Du Page County Water Commission.